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ABSTRACT: In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens 
argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the 
‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable against other aims in 
deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have 
pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving 
belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim of belief is capable of being 
weighed against other aims. Recently, however, Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul 
Noordhof have objected to this response on the grounds that it employs an 
undefended conception of the aim of belief not shared by Owens, and that it 
equivocates between importantly different contexts of doxastic deliberation. In 
this note, I argue that both of these objections fail. 
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1. Weighing the Aim of Belief 
Many have been attracted to the idea that belief ‘aims’ at truth, in the hope of 
thereby demarcating belief from other propositional attitudes, and of explaining a 
number of puzzling features of belief, including the standard of correctness and 
epistemic norms governing belief. However, in his influential discussion of the 
aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best 
metaphorical.1 In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be 
weighable against other aims in deliberation. But Owens claims that this is 
impossible: when we deliberative over whether to believe some proposition, only 
truth-relevant considerations can have a say, to the exclusion of other kinds of 
considerations. No belief is ever the result of deliberative weighing of the aim of 
truth with other non-truth relevant aims and considerations. Belief does therefore 
not ‘aim’ at truth in a genuine and non-metaphorical sense that can carry its 
intended explanatory burden.  
In my previous discussion of this argument, I pointed out that if we broaden 
our focus to other deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the 
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putative aim of belief is capable of the sort of weighing required of genuine aims.2 
In particular, when we deliberative over whether to take up the truth-aim with 
respect to some proposition, it is both relevant and possible to weigh it against 
other kinds of aims. For example, a teacher might weigh the aim of believing the 
truth as to which of her pupils broke the window against the aim of avoiding the 
unpleasant task of having to scold the guilty pupil. Such weighing may very well 
result in the teacher deciding not to pursue the aim of believing the truth with 
respect to that proposition. We might add that it is also possible for such 
considerations to enter into deliberation over whether to believe some particular 
proposition; no belief can result from such weighing, but it can cause the 
deliberation to be terminated without resulting in a belief. The reason that 
deliberation over whether to believe some proposition p does not allow weighing 
in a way that results in a belief as to whether p, I argued, is that such deliberation 
is essentially constrained by the aim of believing p if and only if p is true. This 
excludes the relevance of other kinds of considerations, except to convince one to 
give up the aim and terminate the deliberation. We can thus compare such 
deliberation to other similarly constrained examples of deliberation, such as 
deliberation over whether to go to some restaurant as a way of carrying out the 
aim of going there if and only if it received good reviews.  
This explanation assumes, of course, that the aim one might take up as a 
result of deliberating whether to pursue the truth-aim with respect to some 
proposition p is the very aim that constrains deliberation over whether to believe 
that p, and is responsible for the resulting attitude being a belief. But I provided 
several examples to show that, on reflection, this assumption is quite plausible.3 
This does not entail that all beliefs are related to intentional aims in this way. As I 
have argued in another context, the aim of belief can be realized both by 
intentional aims of believers, and by sub-intentional mechanisms that share 
certain features with intentional aims.4 Nor does it entail that the aim constraining 
deliberation over whether to believe that p is always the result of prior 
deliberation over whether to take up that aim. As with any other aim, it may or 
may not be the result of a deliberative process. 
 
                                                                
2 Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, “Weighing the Aim of Belief,” Philosophical Studies 145 (2009): 
395-405. 
3 Steglich-Petersen, “Weighing the Aim,” 403-404. 
4 Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, “No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief,” The Philosophical 
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2. Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof’s Reply 
Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul Noordhof claim that this response to Owens’ 
argument fails.5 They advance two points in defense of Owens. Their first point6 is 
that the examples I rely on fail because they invoke an undefended conception of 
the truth-aim not shared by Owens, and, they say, ‘officially eschewed’ by 
myself.7 Owens construes the truth-aim as that of believing p only if p is true, thus 
making truth a necessary but not a sufficient condition for adopting belief. His 
reason for preferring this construal is to avoid implausibly attributing to believers 
the aim of believing each and every true proposition, however trivial. Sullivan-
Bissett and Noordhof argue that if this is how we should understand the truth-
aim, my examples of the truth-aim being weighed do not work, since in that case, 
the truth-aim does not insist on the agent forming any beliefs at all, and it 
therefore doesn’t require any consideration whether or not to adopt this aim. For 
example, since adopting the truth-aim with respect to which of the pupils broke 
the window leaves the teacher free not to form any belief at all, it does not require 
any consideration or weighing against other aims on her behalf in deciding 
whether or not to adopt the aim. 
There are several things to say in response to this argument. First of all, it is 
unclear why Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof claim the if-and-only-if conception of 
the truth-aim to be ‘officially eschewed’ by myself. I am quite explicit in the 
discussion that I operate with this conception,8 and it plays an integral and 
obvious role in my theory of doxastic deliberation, both in the article under 
discussion and elsewhere.9 My guess is that they take the rejection of this 
conception as implied by me not objecting explicitly upon presenting Owens’ 
conception, and his reason for preferring this. But nowhere else in the paper do I 
operate with Owens’ conception.   
Secondly, although I do not explicitly defend my own conception of the 
truth-aim in the paper, it should be clear that Owens’ reason for preferring his 
conception is irrelevant on my account. Owens’ reason was that we shouldn’t 
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attribute to believers the aim of coming to a true belief with respect to all 
propositions. But this consideration only carries weight if we conceive of the 
truth-aim as a general aim in the first place. Clearly, believers don’t have the aim 
of coming to a true belief for any p. But on my account, when believers have the 
aim of truth, they have it with respect to particular propositions or classes of 
propositions, not all propositions. So I do not attribute to believers a general aim of 
the sort rightly rejected by Owens. 
Third, it clearly doesn’t undermine my discussion that Owens doesn’t share 
my preferred construal of the truth-aim. What is at issue is whether or not there is 
an interesting and non-metaphorical sense in which belief aims at truth, and in 
particular whether this aim satisfies Owens’ requirement that it must be 
weighable against other aims. Owens (and Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof) may 
have shown that on one particular construal of the truth-aim as a matter of 
necessary conditions for belief, this aim fails to satisfy Owens’ requirement. But I 
can see no reason why it shouldn’t be fair to object that there is another 
interesting construal of the truth aim that does satisfy Owens’ weighing 
requirement. 
Finally, it is all but clear that Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof’s argument 
holds, even if we accept that the truth-aim should be understood as a mere 
necessary condition for adopting belief (which I don’t). It is certainly not in 
general the case that conditional aims of doing something only if some other 
condition obtains do not require and allow for weighing with other aims and 
considerations. Suppose, for example, that I am considering whether to aim for 
going to staff meetings only if there will be cake. Pursuing this aim could easily 
conflict with other aims of mine, such as the aim of staying on good terms with 
my Department Chair, and it is certainly relevant to weigh the cake-aim against 
this other aim in deliberation. It might be objected that such weighing is relevant 
only if one is interested in going to staff meetings in the first place: if one doesn’t 
have any intention of going to staff meetings anyways, it would be a mute point 
whether one resolves only to go to meetings with cake. But that also seems too 
strong. Even if I am undecided on whether to go to staff meetings, it could still 
require weighing and consideration whether I should aim to go only if there will 
be cake. These considerations seem to apply to the belief case as well: even if the 
teacher does not yet have any intention of forming a belief as to which of the 
pupils broke the window, it could be a relevant matter for weighing and 
deliberation whether she should aim to adopt some belief on the matter only if the 
belief is true. 
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Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof’s second point10 is that deliberating about 
whether to take up the truth-aim with respect to some proposition p is different 
from deliberating about whether to believe that p. As they say, Owens’ claim 
about the exclusive relevance of truth was only meant to apply to the latter kind 
of deliberation, so I am missing the target when pointing out that the truth-aim is 
weighable in the former kind of deliberation. But I have never claimed that these 
two kinds of deliberation are the same; in fact, my main observation is that there 
are several different contexts of deliberation in which the truth-aim can play a 
role, and that it is weighable in at least one of these contexts. As I make explicit, 
my account assumes that the aim one might take up as a result of deliberating 
whether to pursue the truth-aim with respect to some p, is the very aim that 
constrains deliberation over whether to believe that p, thereby explaining the 
exclusive relevance of truth in this kind of deliberation.11 This assumption is not 
beyond question, of course, but Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof do not address it. 
3. Conclusion 
I conclude that Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof’s defense of Owens’ exclusivity 
objection fails. Their first point rests on a misinterpretation of my conception of 
the truth-aim (and even if their interpretation had been correct, it is not clear that 
their point would survive). Their second point fails to address the idea that the 
aim one might take up as a result of deliberating whether to pursue a true belief as 
to whether p, can constrain deliberation over whether to believe that p. 
                                                                
10 Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof, “A Defence of Owens,” 455-456. 
11 Steglich-Petersen, “Weighing the Aim,” 403-404. 
